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Evolutionary processes such as selection and drift are causes of population-level change.  Matthen and Ariew (2002) and Walsh, Lewens, and Ariew (2002) have recently challenged this claim, arguing that selection and drift are best understood as statistical trends rather than causes.  Matthen and Ariew claim:
… natural selection is a mathematical aggregate of individual events. This seems to imply that it is not a causally connected process. The increase of fitness in a population by means of natural selection is, as we see it, a temporal sequence of aggregates, a running tally of lower level events; it is not a process within which the earlier events cause the later (2002, 79)

And Walsh et al. claim:
Selection and drift are not forces acting on populations; they are statistical properties of an assemblage of ‘trial’ events: births, deaths and reproduction  (2002, 453).

We think these positions confuse the broad question of whether evolutionary processes are causal factors at all with the narrower question of whether drift and selection should be described as forces in the Newtonian sense.  On their view, for selection and drift to be causal they must be forces causing individual-level events such as births and deaths of individuals within a population.  We disagree. Whether evolutionary processes should count as “forces,” and what this entails about nature of causation are interesting but peripheral questions.​[1]​ We will focus on the broad causal status question and argue that drift and selection are, in an important and explanatory sense, population-level causes of evolutionary change. Understanding evolutionary processes in this way, we maintain, makes sense of evolutionary biology as it is practiced.
Our defense will proceed as follows. First, we will give a philosophical argument that selection and drift count as causes based on a connection between manipulation and causation. We will augment the philosophical argument by taking a closer look at an exemplary study in evolutionary biology that manipulates the processes of selection and drift in a way that changes the evolutionary outcomes of populations.  We will then defend our causal interpretation of the study against possible objections based on the statistical view. 

2.  Manipulation and causation
We offer a simple, deductive argument for treating selection and drift as causes of evolutionary change in populations. The argument is not premised upon any specific account of the necessary and sufficient conditions for causation, but only a single sufficient condition. Loosely stated, the condition is thus: if you can systematically manipulate variable A to bring about a change in variable B, then A is a cause of B.​[2]​ For example, if you can systematically manipulate the position of a switch to bring about a change in the brightness of a light bulb, then the position of the switch is a cause of the brightness of the bulb. We will refer to this condition as the manipulation condition (MC). The structure of our argument is as follows:

[Premise 1]	The manipulation condition (MC)
[Premise 2]	The character of selection and drift in a population can be manipulated as a strategy for changing the dynamics of a population
[Conclusion]	Selection and drift are causes of population-level change

In this section, we will elaborate upon and defend our two premises. Our conclusion follows deductively.
	To begin with premise 1, what do we mean by ‘manipulation’ and why is manipulation relevant to causation? We have in mind an extremely basic, intuitive test for detecting a causal connection. The test is hardly original. Suppose that you observe two types of events that tend to go together: whenever you see a certain switch pointing upwards, a certain light is on; whenever the switch is pointing downwards, the light is off. If you had no prior knowledge about lights and switches, you would not know whether there were a causal connection between the switch and the light (or vice-versa), whether the state of both the light and the switch were effects of a common cause, or whether the association between the switch and the light were a mere coincidence. How would you decide between these alternatives? One obvious tactic is to manipulate the switch (or the bulb) and to see what happens. If repeatedly toggling the switch has the effect of repeatedly changing the state of the bulb, then it will be obvious enough that the state of the switch is a cause of the state of the bulb.​[3]​ In this sense, to manipulate a variable (such as the state of a switch) is to cause the variable to change.  Of course, there are numerous possible ways to confound this test—for example, the switch might not be hooked up to anything and the light might be controlled remotely by a devious man behind a curtain—but we can imagine more rigorous versions of the test where we control for greater numbers of these kinds of confounding factors. 
	The above test, when well controlled, is sufficient for detecting a causal relationship. This is just what MC says: if you can systematically manipulate variable A to bring about a change in variable B, then A is a cause of B. MC is evidently a fundamental and well-established principle of experimental science. It is possible to give a deeper philosophical justification for MC (Cartwright 1983; Woodward 2003), but we will not labor the point any further here. It is worth noting explicitly that we are not  suggesting that MC is anything like a necessary  condition for identifying causal relationships. Some philosophical accounts of causation (notably, manipulationist accounts such Woodward’s) give manipulation a central role. One need not accept such an account of causation in order to accept MC. As a mere sufficient condition, MC fits naturally with most philosophical accounts of causation.
Let us turn to the second premise. When populations meet certain conditions, the processes of selection and drift operate and can lead to evolution.  Following Endler (1986) we will identify the necessary and sufficient conditions for the processes of selection and drift, and the evolutionary changes that occur when these conditions are met. These conditions make it clear that manipulating the strength of selection or drift is a strategy for changing the evolutionary dynamics of populations.
Evolution by the process of natural selection occurs in a population if and only if there is (Endler 1986, 4): (1)  phenotypic variation—variation among individuals in some attribute or trait within the population; (2)  trait fitness variation—a consistent relationship between the trait and mating ability, fertilizing ability, fertility, fecundity, and/or survivorship; and (3)  inheritance—a consistent relationship, for that trait, between parents and offspring such that offspring tend to resemble their parents.  Evolution by the process of drift requires only conditions (1) and (3), plus the population must be finite in size (Endler 1986, 14).  Because drift does not require fitness differences, the process is usually described as stochastic sampling error.  By chance some traits may change in frequency across generations.  Selection, on the other hand, biases the sampling process: fitter traits tend to increase in frequency.  When the relevant conditions are met the selection, drift, or some combination of these processes can cause evolutionary change.​[4]​
The evolutionary changes these processes can produce include the two types of change identified by Endler (1986, 4): (i) “the trait frequency distribution will differ among age classes or life-history stages, beyond that expected from ontogeny;” and (ii) “if the population is not at equilibrium, then the trait distribution of all offspring will be predictably different from that of all parents…”​[5]​  Notice that the first type of change includes cases of stabilizing selection where the trait distribution of juveniles or gametes changes within a generation to produce the same trait distribution in offspring that is observed in the parental generation.  The second type of change includes cumulative directional selection across generations, evolution by drift, and cases where selection pressures vary from generation to generation.  For example, Grant (1986) shows that selection pressures existing during a drought push the distribution of finch beak size in one direction.  These selection pressures reverse in subsequent generations when the drought ends and so push the trait distribution in the opposite direction. 
When a finite population satisfies (2), drift and selection interact; this follows from the definitions of selection and drift. The interaction of these two processes depends on the effective size of the population.  If the population is small enough, drift can confound the process of selection. The relative strength of drift and selection is assessed by comparing effective population size (N) with the strength of selection (s).  If Ns >> 1 then selection predominates, although drift still occurs.  So any new beneficial mutation may be lost by drift, even in very large populations.  
Manipulating the population size or the strength of selection will alter the character of selection and drift, and the way they interact.  A manipulation of N while controlling for s (or vice versa) can alter the kind evolutionary changes of trait distribution T in population P.  Generally, drift can produce evolutionary change when (2) is absent, when N is small relative to s, or when some beneficial trait t exists at a very low frequency.  Selection can produce evolutionary change when fitness effects are strong enough to predominate drift and t overcomes the risk of initial loss by drift.  How selection, drift, and their interaction affect the evolutionary change of T in P will depend on the empirical details of the case.  The effects of these processes can be investigated by manipulating N or s in replicates of P.  Indeed, clear strategies of intervention exist for the experimental manipulation of selection and drift, and such manipulations do result in population-level change (Endler 1986, 75-81; Travisano et al. 1995). We will consider a detailed example of such an experimental manipulation in a moment.
To summarize, we have articulated a sufficient condition for identifying causal relationships and we have argued that the relationship between evolutionary processes, such as selection and drift, and population-level change meets this condition. 


3.  An experimental study of selection and drift 
To show that the practice of evolutionary biology supports our causal interpretation of selection and drift we will examine an experimental study conducted by Dobzhansky and Pavlovsky (1957). They manipulate a population-level parameter to test how selection and drift interact to produce evolutionary change. As we would expect from MC, they justifiably interpret the results of their manipulations as evidence for a causal relation between drift and a kind of population-level change.
	The study aims to test how drift and selection interact by varying the size of a founding population and observing the results of uniform selection pressures on replicate populations.  This tests whether the founder effect can produce evolutionary change.  The founder effect occurs when a part of a larger population founds a new subpopulation.  Since the initial founding population size tends to be small and founding members have a random subset of the total genetic variation available in original population, this is a kind of drift.  The study manipulates the strength of drift while controlling for (i.e., holding fixed) selection pressures.
	Dobzhansky and Pavlovsky used chromosome variants of fruit flies maintained at a stable polymorphic equilibrium by heterozygote advantage (i.e., overdominant selection).  Different polymorphisms were maintained in different geographically isolated populations.  They isolated individuals homozygous for one variant, PP, from a population in Texas as well as individuals homozygous for a different variant, AR, from a population in California.  They then crossed these two lines to form an experimental stock where the frequencies of both AR and PP were equal to 50%.  From the experimental stock they formed ten replicates with a large founding population (4,000 flies), and ten replicates with a small founding population (20 flies; 10 male, 10 female), all with the frequency of AR and PP equal to 50%.  This is their manipulation of the strength of the founder effect.  The large and small replicates were raised in a laboratory environment that maintained uniform selection pressures, and were allowed to grow to the same stable population size.  Based on preliminary research they expected AR and PP to reach a stable equilibrium with both variants maintained by heterozygote advantage.
	In the experiment, Dobzhansky and Pavlovsky held selection pressure constant and manipulated the founding population size, a population-level parameter.  They then observed the effects of this manipulation by sampling the frequency of the variants after 4 generations, and again after enough generations had passed for each replicate to reach equilibrium.  They obtained the following results (Figure 1).  The mean frequencies of PP for all small and for all large replicate populations decreased, and the two means did not exhibit a statistically significant difference (1957, 316).   Also, each replicate responded differently to the same selection pressures.  The small replicates exhibited a greater heterogeneity; the observed variance in equilibrium PP frequency among the small replicates was greater than the variance observed in the large replicates.  Dobzhansky and Pavlovsky found that the difference in heterogeneity between large and small replicate populations to be statistically significant (1957, 316).


Figure 1: the initial frequency of large replicates is given on the left, and the initial frequency of small replicates, on the right (all 50% PP).  The two samples, after 4 generations and after replicates reached equilibrium, are plotted from outside in.  The equilibrium frequencies of the large and small replicates are compared on the center axis (from Dobzhansky and Pavlovsky 1957, 315).

Dobzhansky and Pavlovsky identified selection for a stable polymorphic equilibrium as the cause of the change in PP frequency from 50% to equilibrium within each replicate population: 
Heterozygotes that carry a PP and an AR third chromosome are superior in adaptive value to the PP and AR homozygotes.  Therefore, the frequencies of PP and AR chromosomes in the experimental populations are controlled by natural selection (1957, 318).  

They identified random drift, in the form of the founder effect, as the cause of the heterogeneous results produced by selection in both large and small replicates, and as the cause of the statistically significant difference between large and small replicates: 
… random drift caused different segments of the this gene pool to be included in the foundation stocks of each population, especially in the small ones; natural selection produced divergent results in different populations, especially again amongst the small ones (1957, 317).

Their conclusions are expressed using causal language: selection “controlled” the equilibrium frequencies of chromosomes; drift “caused” different subsets of genetic variation to be included in the founding populations; the same selection pressure “produced” divergent results.  They treated drift, selection, and their interaction as causes of the evolutionary change observed in replicate populations.  They did not try to decompose selection and drift into component forces, or attempt to identify how selection and drift cause individual births or deaths.  Instead, they manipulated the founding population size, a parameter that affects the relative strength of the drift process, to test whether it altered the evolutionary changes produced by identical selection pressures. According to MC, the founder effect is a cause of increased heterogeneity.  A similar conclusion probably holds for selection as well. For example, if a manipulation were to change the fitness structure (while controlling for population size) such that the PP homozygotes had a greater fitness than both AR homozygotes and heterozygotes, then PP would fix in almost all replicates. Following MC, selection would be a cause of the increase in PP frequency.  Thus, not only is scientific practice consistent with a causal interpretation of evolutionary theory, but the practice has a sound basis with MC.

4.  The non-causal alternative
 So far, we have articulated the positive case for treating evolutionary processes such as selection and drift are causes of population-level change. Our thesis opposes the non-causal view of selection and drift favored by Matthen and Ariew (2002) and Walsh, Lewens, and Ariew (2002). According to this view, the only causes of the evolution of a population are individual-level events, such as the myriad births, deaths and reproductive events of the individuals within the population. It follows that selection and drift are not really causes of population-level change; they are merely statistical summaries of events taking place at the individual-level. In this section we consider an objection to our approach that is motivated by the non-causal view.
Advocates of the non-causal view may object to our philosophical interpretation of the Dobzhansky and Pavlovsky experiment. We claim that Dobzhanzky and Pavlovsky manipulated a population-level variable (founding population size) to test the effect of drift on replicate populations. Yet, there is an alternative description of the experiment such that the manipulation took place on individual-level causal factors, not population-level ones. On the alternative description, the manipulation of founding population size amounts to randomly picking particular individuals from the experimental stock.  This manipulation causes some individuals to be in the founding population rather than others. Because the founding individuals of each replicate population differ in their individual genetic properties, the evolutionary trends observed in each replicate also differ.  The overall difference in heterogeneity between small and large replicates is caused by the different methods for choosing the founding individuals in each replicate.  Choosing more founding individuals for large replicates than for small replicates has consistent downstream causal consequences for individual births and deaths occurring within each replicate.  So there is a statistical difference between the large and small replicates, but this difference is caused by manipulating individual-level events, not by manipulating the strength of drift; ‘strength of drift’ is merely a label for the statistical difference between the individuals in large and in small replicate populations. 
The tactic of situating all of the causal action in evolution at the individual-level can be repeated for any purported manipulation of population-level causes. It is thus not only a threat to our interpretation of the Dobzhansky and Pavlovsky experiment, but to the second premise of our argument in section 2. How should we respond to this threat? First off, we want to be clear that we readily accept that there are individual-level causes that operate and that can explain the results of the Dobzhansky and Pavlovsky experiment. However, we think that in addition to these individual-level causes, there are also population-level causes and that is what drift and selection are. Moreover, we maintain that it makes sense to describe Dobzhansky and Pavlovsky as having manipulated a population-level variable. There are three reasons for this.
First, the obvious reason to suppose they manipulated a population-level variable is that their design for the experiment contains no description of individual-level variables. They adjusted founding population size with no regard to which particular individuals were chosen for the founding population; so long as all large replicates had 4,000 founding members and small replicates had 20, they could test for the effects of this population-level manipulation.  In fact, one reason for using multiple replicates is to wash out individual-level differences between treatments in order to get a clearer understanding of the population-level changes produced by the manipulation of founding population size.  
	Second, to deny the reality of selection and drift as macro-level variables seems to involve an implicit metaphysical assumption that only micro-level variables have any causal reality. For example, Walsh et al. write that “the only genuine forces going on in evolution are those taking place at the level of individuals (or lower) and none of these (and no aggregate of these) can be identified with either selection or drift” (2002, 453). We agree that no individual-level events or aggregate of such events can be identified with either selection or drift. The reason for this is that the grain at which selection and drift are described (for example, by Endler’s definition) is multiply realizable by any number of possible individual-level causal histories. Yet the fact that these processes are multiply realizable does not imply that they are not real or that they are non-causal. Fodor (1974,1997) effectively defends the claim that there may be causal generalizations in the special sciences that supervene upon, but do not reduce to, causal generalizations at lower levels of analysis. Following Fodor, we suggest that whether there are causal generalizations at higher levels of analysis is a question to be settled by scientific investigation, not philosophical reflection. Dobzhansky and Pavlovsky conduct just such an investigation.  Given that they detected a systematic relationship between the varying strength of drift and heterogeneity of gene frequencies across replicates, why should they be barred from describing this relationship as a casual one?  
	Finally, if Dobzhansky and Pavlovsky had only manipulated their system at the individual-level, there would be no additional information gained by a population-level description of the manipulation.  But, following Jackson and Pettit (1992), we suggest that micro- and macro-level description of the evolutionary process convey different information. Jackson and Pettit identify two types of information that may be provided by an explanation of an event. The first type tells us about the precise causes of the event as it actually occurred. The second type identifies parallels between the way in which the event actually occurred and the ways in which it might otherwise have been. They call the first type of information modally contrastive because it identifies differences between the actual world and other possible worlds. They call the second type of information modally comparative because it identifies similarities. Our contention is that selection and drift are not merely statistical summaries of individual-level events because descriptions of evolution that appeal to these processes provide modally comparative information not contained in individual-level descriptions.
	If modally contrastive information were all that mattered to explaining an event, the most informative explanation would always be a description of the causal history of the event at the smallest micro-level available to us. For example, we could explain the evolutionary change of an actual population by describing the causal histories of the individuals within population. (Or better still, we might attempt to describe the whole scenario at the level of fundamental particles.) Yet, we could be in possession of such information without knowing something important: namely, how sensitive the changes in the population were to those micro-level causal details. That is what modally comparative information provides. Kim Sterelny (2001) prefers to call modally comparative information robust-process information because it points to features of a causal outcome that resulted from a robust process such that that those features would have turned out much the same even if the micro-level details had been different. Jackson and Pettit suggest that micro-descriptions of an event tend to convey more modally contrastive information about it, whereas macro-descriptions tend to convey more modally comparative information. Macro-descriptions may thus contain information relevant to an event’s causal history that is not contained within a micro-description of the same event. Dobzhanksy and Pavlovsky’s experiment supports a macro-level generalization involving two macro-level variables—founding population size and the equilibrium gene frequencies. This macro-level generalization provides modally comparative information about how drift and selection affect the downstream causal history of populations, information not contained in a micro-level description. Yet the experimental support for the macro-level generalization is only evident once we see that Dobzhanksy and Pavlovsky manipulated their system at the macro-level.

5. Conclusion
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^1	  See Stephens (in prep) for discussion of the Newtonian force analogy and its commitments about causation.
^2	  Woodward (2003) articulates a similar, but more precise, sufficient condition for causation.
^3	  This is not to rule out the (remote) possibility that unscrewing the bulb will have the effect of toggling the switch. In this bizarre case, we may also conclude that the state of the bulb is a cause of the state of the switch.
^4	  Selection and drift are not the only evolutionary processes.  For example, mutation, migration, recombination, and other processes also occur.  Much of the argument in the literature, however, focuses on selection and drift, and so we follow suit.
^5	  Selection allows one to predict the offspring trait distribution based on the parental trait distribution.  Drift, however, only allows one to predict a probability distribution of possible offspring trait distributions (Hartl and Clark 1997). 
